One of the prevailing themes to this week's Capitol Hill testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker was an increase in rhetoric bemoaning the influence of Iran in the Iraqi occupation. While I don't see any chance Bush gets away with starting an active conflict with Iran in the next nine months, nothing will prevent him from escalating the verbal conflict.
That said, in the theatrical framework we've become accustomed to in hearings such as the ones held this week, Iran in the abstract can be bandied about as nemesis without any real exploration into just what that influence entails. Or, for that matter, how it is that hundreds of people all started saying 'special groups' on the same day. Was 'freedom haters' taken? I didn't get the memo.
That Iran wants to increase its influence in the region can pretty much be accepted without argument. It's how the Shiite theocracy is going about it that seems to be a source of confusion for some.
There seems, among supporters of prolonged occupation, a belief that the only way for Iran to garner influence in its neighbor to the West is by funding Shiite militias. Well, scratch that. Shiite militias who object to the American presence. That Iran provides assistance and support to all of the various Shiite militias--whether they are allied with the Maliki government or not--seems a fact either too cumbersome or too incongruent with the reigning narrative to lend much credence to.
To believe that, though, one must be of the assumption that Iran, having surveyed the landscape, has decided that the best way to ensconce itself in the Iraqi reality is to ally itself most closely with the Shiite militias opposed to the government, choosing them over those militias allied with al Maliki. Common sense dictates that logic is somewhat backward.
Iran has plenty of access to the Iraqi government itself. Why, then, would a distraction of resources among less-productive alliances be beneficial? While Iran is no doubt aiding al Sadr, there is no reason to believe that this is done to the exclusion of relationships with other, better-connected groups.
Consider this CBS News report from Christmas, 2006:U.S. troops in Iraq detained at least two Iranians and released two others who had diplomatic immunity in an exercise the White House says may support its charge that Iran is helping fuel the insurgency there.
Two of those detained were visiting as guests of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, his spokesman said.
"We suspect this event validates our claims about Iranian meddling, but we want to finish our investigation of the detained Iranians before characterizing their activities," White House spokesman Alex Conant said Monday.
[...]
The New York Times reported Monday that U.S. forces were holding four Iranians, including some seized at the compound of Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the largest Shiite bloc in Iraq's parliament, who met with President Bush earlier this month at the White House.[...]
Hakim is not only one of Iraq's leading Shiites,...he is often thought of as an alternative to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki if al-Maliki proves unable to control the violence.
Okay, so it proves the contention that Iran is meddling, but in this case as a guest of the President. Or the leader of the ISCI. Both of which are presumed American allies, not a nefarious splinter group or marginalized radical. This is not to point to an exclusion of that influence, but rather to illustrate the existence aid to US allies as well.
It is beyond doubt at this point that the seminal event in the expansion of Iranian influence in the region was the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Saddam was just as much a thorn in the side of the Iranians as he was to the US, a check on their power and a geographical buffer between Syria and Iran. With Hussein out of the way, the US virtually guaranteed a Shiite-led government sympathetic to the Iranians and paved the way for a Shiite swath across the midsection of the Middle East.Clearly there is a crossing of signals between US policy makers and the leadership of Iraq. John McCain recently said that a 'successful' Iraq would be an 'enemy of Iran.' This thought process offers so little in the way of reason it's astounding. First, for a struggling, inefficient, and weak nation such as Iraq to start making enemies with its neighbor right out of the gate would be ludicrous and suicidal. Second, the Iraqi and Iranian leadership are natural allies. Most of the current leaders of Iraq spent their time in exile under Saddam in Iran. That the Iraqi leadership doesn't acquire the US animosity toward Iran simply as quid pro quo for greasing the tracks to their positions of authority is no surprise, nor should such a relationship be expected.
Remarking at Ahmadinejad's March 2 visit:"I think that the level of trust is very high," Maliki said. "And I say frankly that the position Iran has taken recently was very helpful in bringing back security and stability."
Again, this argument speaks not to Iran as a constructive player on the world stage, only the relationship between the neighboring countries.
The New American:Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in Baghdad on March 2 on an historic trip to Iraq, the first ever for an Iranian president. Iraq’s political and religious leaders greeted him with great fanfare, laying out red carpets and having military bands play for him. Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani fondly asked Ahmadinejad to call him “Uncle Jalal.”
Ahmadinejad also held meetings with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, and Shiite religious leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council.
Perhaps nothing exemplifies the myriad allegiances of Iran more than the al Hakim-led ISCI and its military arm, the Badr Brigade.
From Globalsecurity.org:The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a Shi'i resistance group also known as the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), was formed in Iran in 1982 to provide an opposition to Iraqi aggression against Iran. Following the Iran-Iraq war, the organization continued to operate with the aim of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. SCIRI was directly supported with funds by Tehran and with arms by Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard. The movement advocated theocratic rule for Iraq and conducted a low-level, cross-border guerrilla war against the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Absent Saddam, ISCI was in a position for a slight makeover, as this Reuters article explains. Aside from dropping the 'Revolution' part of its name, ISCI also aligned itself more visibly with Iraq and Grand Ayatollah al Sistani. But, as the article states, as of May 2007 "the group [got] its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran."
The reason behind the change is not difficult to discern. Surely, it is less an attempt to side-step Iran and more a strategic maneuver borne of an accurate perception that allying themselves with the Iraqis and the Americans would put them in a much better position to obtain further power. It's a relationship of convenience more than an altruistic change of heart.
Consider the influence the ISCI has already gained in light of its archrival Muqtada al Sadr's political party's increasingly marginalized position within the political sphere.
Peter Galbraith for Salon: At the same time, L. Paul Bremer's CPA appointed party officials from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to be governors and serve on governorate councils throughout southern Iraq. SCIRI, recently renamed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), was founded at the Ayatollah Khomeini's direction in Tehran in 1982. The Badr Organization is the militia associated with SCIRI.
In the January 2005 elections, SCIRI became the most important component of Iraq's ruling Shiite coalition. In exchange for not taking the prime minister's slot, SCIRI won the right to name key ministers, including the minister of the interior. From that ministry, SCIRI placed Badr militiamen throughout Iraq's national police.
In short, George W. Bush had from the first facilitated the very event he warned would be a disastrous consequence of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq: the takeover of a large part of the country by an Iranian-backed militia.
Indeed, despite having told the Sunni Awakening Councils that there wasn't room for them in the Iraqi Security Forces, 10,000 Badr militia men were inducted into the ISF after the recent fighting in Basra. This is the same organization that until a year ago was not shy about its origins in--and continued ties with--Iran.
Just today, Dick Cheney raised the specter of al Qaeda control of Iraqi oil reserves upon a US withdrawal. But reality suggests Iran is already in a significantly better position to do just that. Basra contains 70 percent of the Iraqi oil reserves, and that town is solidly in the hands of Iranian-backed Shiite militias.
Galbraith:Since 2005, Iraq's Shiite-led government has concluded numerous economic, political and military agreements with Iran. The most important would link the two countries' strategic oil reserves by building a pipeline from southern Iraq to Iran, while another commits Iran to providing extensive military assistance to the Iraqi government. According to a senior official in Iraq's Oil Ministry, smugglers divert at least 150,000 barrels of Iraq's daily oil exports through Iran, a figure that approaches 10 percent of Iraq's production.
Given the complex political scene that is Iraq, any over simplification is sure to fall short of the mark. But to insist without a hint of uncertainty that Iran is backing the opponents of the US-backed Maliki government to the exclusion of all other elements is foolish.
Iran most certainly desires significant influence in Iraq, and it undoubtedly has a pipeline toward that end. That path leads through ISCI and Da'awa, though, not al Sadr. Why would Iran put all its force behind pushing al Sadr alone, when it can ride the coattails of the US-allied government and its surrogates all the way to the top?
Friday, April 11, 2008
Fences Make Good Neighbors
Tuesday, April 8, 2008
Testimonial Vindication
Today's Capitol Hill testimony by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker provided little new in the way of clarifying the tenets of prolonged occupation of Iraq, but plenty of room for grandstanding on both sides of the aisle. Republicans--when they could keep their enemies straight--were quick to latch onto the slightest indication of progress while Democrats battled to see who could get the dodgiest answers to loaded questions.
Everyone dutifully filled their respective roles, including Petraeus and Crocker demonstrating the long-honored tradition of using a three-minute answer to say precisely nothing.
What the hearings did make clear is that much of what opponents of the war, including myself, have held up as evidence is slowly working its way into the mouths of allies of Bush's war policy.
What, exactly, is 'victory?' It's one thing to say that the American people won't stand for defeat or that defeat isn't an option, but to do so implies that there's a tangible definition of 'victory.' Part of agreeing upon a common language is that the words that constitute it are paired with clear definitions. To achieve victory, one must have a clear definition, and we still haven't gotten that from the administration, Petraeus, or John McCain and his toadies Lindsey Graham and Joe Liebermann.
Nearly nothing that could masquerade as victory in any acceptable sense has been accomplished. Few of the so-called 'benchmarks' have been met. The Iraqi security forces clearly demonstrated last week that they are not able to function independent of US support. The Iraqis are far from achieving anything close to financial independence, despite being located atop pools of natural cash. Clearly, there is no single condition that is on the verge of being met which could conceivably serve as a signal of victory in the pure sense of the word, which for now serves as a tool of those bereft of any substantive factual devices to substitute for the rhetorical.
Though the argument is mysteriously absent from most Iraq discussions, supporters of the war occasionally remember to tie the war in the specific to the broader War on Terror. Besides continued conflagration of al Qaeda/Iran threat the war is held up as one step to making America safer.
But when questioned by Senator Warner of Virginia (R) on such a seemingly central proposition to continued occupation, Petraeus was non-committal at best. WARNER: It was a fairly simple question: does that translate into a greater security for those of us at home? … Can you now just tell us in simple language tell us yes it is worth it, and it is making us safer here at home?
PETRAEUS: Senator, I do believe it is worth it, otherwise I would have not accepted. … I took on the task of, the privilege of command of MNF-Iraq because I do believe that it is worth, and I do believe the interests there are of enormous importance, again, to our country, not just to the people of Iraq and the people of that region and the world.
If lessening al Qaeda's influence in Iraq is what is making America safer, not allowing them the vacuum to fill in the first place would be preferable, no? Basically, when asked if the war made the country safer, the General finally settles on a hesitant answer of 'yes, because we've lessened the threat that the war itself created.' Stultifying logic.
Another significant point of contention by those who oppose the war is that the nexus of terror lies not in Iraq but at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today's testimony finally elicited agreement on that point from Amb. Crocker. SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Ambassador, is Al Qaeda a greater threat to US interests in Iraq, or in the Afghan-Pakistan border region?
AMB. CROCKER: Mr. Chairman, Al Qaeda is a strategic threat to the United States wherever it is, in my view–
SEN. BIDEN: Where is most of it? If you could take it out? You had a choice: Lord almighty came down and sat in the middle of the table there and said ‘Mr. Ambassador you can eliminate every Al Qaeda source in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or every Al Qaeda personnel in Iraq,’ which would you pick?
AMB. CROCKER: Well given the progress that has been made again Al Qaeda in Iraq, the significant decrease in its capabilities, the fact that it is solidly on the defensive, and not in a position of–
SEN. BIDEN: Which would you pick, Mr. Ambassador?
AMB. CROCKER: I would therefore pick Al Qaeda in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area.
SEN BIDEN: That would be a smart choice.
Biden clearly pushed him into the corner with a loaded question, but the result is still telling. Crocker again bases his response on a lowering of the AQI threat, which didn't exist prior to the war. Given that was his only qualifier to his answer, it follows logically that had the AQI threat not been created by the invasion of Iraq, there would be no question in his mind as to where the real threat lied.
Opponents of the war are often painted as anti-security, which would be a very curious position to take were it true, but such accusations belie the central point. No one disputes that terror exists. No one disputes that America has many enemies. What is in dispute, however, is where in 2003 and still today that threat is most centralized. And it's not Iraq.
Finally, what is becoming increasingly clear is a gravitation toward painting Iran as the central enemy. As has been said before, trying to tie Iran to one side or the other is erroneous, as they have ties to all Shi'a groups in Iraq, not just the Mahdi Army. Ambassador Crocker admitted as much today. SEN. REED: Mr. Ambassador, is the Mahdi Army…the only Shi’a organization that is receiving assistance, cooperation, has significant contacts on a routine basis with the Iranians?
AMB. CROCKER: I don’t think so, Senator.
SEN. REED: Who else might be having that kind of contact? If not military training, then a dialogue, money moving back and forth for other reasons?
AMB. CROCKER: Let me — those are two different aspects and I’ll address them separately. There are other militia groups down in Basra, a militia organization called Thar Allah, the Vengeance of God, whose leader, incidentally, is now in detention. They almost certainly get support from Iran, as does something called Iraqi Hezbollah. That does not necessarily imply a connection to Lebanese Hezbollah, but again, an extremist militia. Iran has the — again the tactic, as we’ve seen in Lebanon, of supporting a number of different–
SEN. REED: Would that include the ISCI element, the Badr Brigade?
AMB. CROCKER: I’d put that in the second category. Iran has a dialogue with, again –
SEN. REED: Everyone in the Shi’a community.
AMB. CROCKER: — everyone. That’s right. And –
SEN. REED: And it’s a mutual dialogue.
AMB. CROCKER: And not just the Shi’a community. What has happened with the Supreme Council and Badr is that they’ve basically gotten out of the overt militia business. It’s now the Badr organization. And many of its elements did integrate with the Iraqi security forces.
What's amusing is that without trying he gave his opponents the gem that claiming the name 'Hezbollah' "does not necessarily imply a connection to Lebanese Hezbollah." That the same is true of a relationship between AQI and bin Laden's al Qaeda should come as no shock.
More onerous, though, is Crocker's claim that the Badr organization has "gotten out of the overt militia business." This was achieved in part by the absorption of 10,000 of its members into the ISF.
Grandstanding aside, the testimony today illustrates an ever-so-slight movement toward vindication of many of the tenets of the war opposition.
Monday, April 7, 2008
Support the Troops: Make Them More Than a Campaign Prop
In American political discourse, opposition to war--in the general or the particular--must always be counterbalanced with an unquestioning belief that US troops are paradigmatic of all that is good and virtuous about the country. To oppose the war is possible, but comes with marginalization. To be perceived as not supporting the troops is a death sentence.
Support, however, comes in many different forms. While proponents of the war are always willing to lend their rhetorical and moral support in heaping portions, tangible support is often hard for the soldiers to come by. Famously, Donald Rumsfeld lent his support to troops looking through landfills for scrap metal to armor their vehicles thusly: "As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want." And thus were the spirits of the troops lifted by the support of their generous patrons in Washington.
That was 2004. Now comes a report released by the Inspector General of the Defense Department revealing that nearly half of Army contracts between 2004 and 2006 were put into rotation "without the gear ever going through an initial test."Nearly $3 billion worth of body armor did not go through early inspections known as "first article testing," or FAT, that are performed before major production to ensure that a company can meet the contract's requirements and to catch any defects...
"Army contracting officials did not require or perform FAT for 13 of the 28 Army contracts and orders reviewed," the report said. As a result, the Defense Department "has no assurance" that the equipment produced under the 13 contracts "met the required standards," the report said.
'Supporting the troops' has become an empty, vapid mantra recited by those who wish to perpetuate a war fought under false pretenses and marginalize all those who disagree. But when it comes to supporting the soldiers in tangible form, such as testing the body armor their lives depend on, those same people are the first off the train.
The Army's response is a thing of beauty:The Army manager who oversees the body armor program told Defense Department officials that "the Army has no evidence of deaths that can be attributed to defective body armor."
Oh. Of course not. "None of this equipment in all of the tests we've done is flawed," said Paul Boyce, the spokesman. "It has not shown any signs of flaws."
None of the equipment you tested is faulty? Fantastic. But perhaps the point has eluded you. It's the armor you didn't test we're worried about.
Disagreements over the war aside, if you're sending the military overseas, it is at least a primary responsibility to properly equip and protect them. To bellow and proselytize about morale and support while wrapping a young man in armor you don't know is flawless rings hollow.
Hawks already have a monopoly on rhetorical support of the troops. Now we just need them to supplement that with a little tangible support.
Sunday, April 6, 2008
1993 John McCain Battles 2008 John McCain
John McCain's faux gravitation to the right during his most recent campaign is readily apparent. What has been lacking, however, is any significantly-deep look into just what that entails. While at times McCain seems to be looking through his notes to see what his positions are supposed to be, it is McCain's own words which may do him the most harm. You Tube never forgets.
On Somalia:
Priceless
Transcripts below the fold
In 2008, he's campaigning as the war candidate, but in 1993 he was making the exact case opponents of the Iraq war are making now. It's uncanny.Mr. President, there is no reason for the United States of America to remain in Somalia. The American people want them home, I believe that the majority of Congress wants them home, and to set an artificial date of March 31 or even February 1st, in my view, is not acceptable. The criteria should be to bring them home as rapidly and safely as possible.
Check.What's the criteria and what should be the criteria is our immediate, orderly withdrawal from Somalia. And if we don't do that, and other Americans die, other Americans are wounded, other Americans are captured, because we stayed too long, longer than necessary, then I would say that the responsibilities for that lie with the Congress of the United States who did not excercise their authority under the Constitution of the United States and mandate that they be brought home as quickly and safely as possible.
What is this...Constitution...you speak of?But the mission which the American people supported and this Congress supported, in an overwhelming resolution, has been accomplished. The American people did not support the goals of nation-building, peacemaking, law and order and certainly not warlord funding. For us to get into nation-building, law and order, etc, I think is a tragic and terrible mistake.
Amen.But the argument that somehow the United States would suffer a loss to our prestige and our viability, as far as the No. 1 superpower in the world, I think, is baloney. The fact is, what can hurt our prestige, Mr. President, I'll tell you what can hurt our viability, as the world's superpower, and that is, if we inmesh ourselves in a drawn-out situation, which entails the loss of American lives...
Absolutely. Unbelievable.
But that's not all. In 1994, he takes on the US presence in Haiti.The right course of action is to make preparations as quickly as possible to bring our people home. It does not mean as soon as order is restored to Haiti, it doesn't mean as soon as Democracy is flourishing in Haiti, it doesn't mean as soon as we've established a viable nation in Haiti, as soon as possible means as soon as we can get out of Haiti without losing any American lives. Now there may be different interpretations of this Resolution on the other side but it is my view and I want to make it clear and I think the majority of the American people's view that as soon as possible means as soon as possible.
Wow.
These two videos really speak for themselves, but humor me as we count the arguments McCain goes through on his way to laying out the 2008 case against the Iraq war.
He literally walks through the entire catalog of reasons for the Iraq withdrawal twice in two years. This is the exact thinking he thinks presents a danger to America. And. It's. His. Own.