Maliki May Attack Sunni Awakening Councils

One of the more significant factors in the tempering of violence coinciding with the US Surge has been the willingness of Sunnis in the Anbar province to accept money to stop fighting the Americans. While that tact has certainly aided the US, especially on the PR front, it has also created new problems, such as a well-armed block of Sunnis seen as a threat by the predominantly-Shiite government. Garreth Porter, writing for IPS, recounts several issues seen by Colin Kahl, a fellow at the Centre for a New American Security (which supports a long-term US presence in Iraq), during his recent trip to Iraq.

Kahl and the CNAS, as they support a long-term US presence, are put off by Maliki's growing confidence in his security forces and find that he is becoming harder to work with. I interpret that as he's become less receptive to unilateral US demands in the area of a long-term legal framework, which is sour news for the administration. Maliki's confidence has left him opposed to any SOFA without a specific withdrawal date, something the US is loathe to offer, choosing instead to play hardball, saying that without an agreement, the US forces would be pulled out at the turn of the year.

It's hard to fathom Bush following through on such a threat, but that negotiations have deteriorated to such a point is surprising. Most of the tension stems from the US's decision to put its lot in with the Sunnis in an effort to thwart Iranian influence in Iraq. The Iraqi government is overwhelmingly Shiite, and are not open to allowing the freshly-armed Sunnis into the ISF as promised.

Kahl said in the briefing that, of the 103,000 Sunnis belonging to those militias, the Iraqi government had promised to take into the security forces only about 16,000. But in fact, it has approved only 600 applicants thus far, according to Kahl, and most of those have turned out to be Shi’a rather than Sunni militiamen. [Which does nothing to dispel the prevailing notions of Sunnis that the Iraqi government is a Shiite-run militia. -Tim]

"There’s even some evidence that [al-Maliki] wants to start a fight with the Sons of Iraq," said Kahl. "Al-Maliki doesn’t believe he has to accommodate these people. He will only do it if we twist his arm to the breaking point."

Bush was entirely incapable of tempering the ISI's support of militants in Afghanistan, and there is no reason to suspect that his foreign policy has become any more in tune with reality or that he has any strategy up his sleeve for heading off such a conflict should it materialize. If Maliki did decide to go after the Sons of Iraq, the US would be in a position where it was forced to support the established government in a battle with a contingent it has armed and funded for over a year.

Kahl also noted that al Sadr has been drawing his Mahdi army down at the behest of the Iranians. As I noted before, the Iranians do have inroads into the Iraqi government through Shiite militias, but it's Badr and ISCI, not the Mahdi Army. Despite that reality, the US has focused almost entirely on al Sadr's forces. As such, the Iranians seem to be asking al Sadr to draw down so as to remove one of the major reasons for the US to stay in Iraq long-term. By eliminating a US bugaboo, the Iranians hope to see vacation by US forces without suffering any effect on their influence in the Iraqi government.

Kahl's concern are coming from his position in support of a long-term US presence, and cannot be construed as the ramblings of an anti-war hack as the Bush administration loves to do. These are real concerns about the reality on the ground in Iraq, a reality that the Bush administration uniformly fails to address in any of its rhetoric. Iran is serving as a stabilizing force -- for purely selfish motives, to be sure -- and al Maliki is threatening to attack the US's strongest block of allies. These are serious issues that need to be addressed as the deadline for a SOFA quickly approaches.


Related:

Fences Make Good Neighbors, April 11
Iraqi SOFA: Out on the Curb?, July 14

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Iraqi SOFA: Out on the Curb?

Even given the enormous and egregious breeches of Iraqi sovereignty that the SOFA the US was trying to force on the Maliki government contained, I must say that I'm surprised--and impressed--that the Iraqis have held up as well as it seems they have, with the Washington Post reporting that a long-term deal may be all but dead.

Really, the only hope Bush and Crocker had of pushing the deal through was without the involvement of either legislature and sans journalistic scrutiny. Once the details of the proposal got out, it was game over. While Bush serves a country with a complacent populace and complicit Congress, Maliki is more beholden to both in his own country. When religious leaders such as al Sistani began coming out in full force against the SOFA, there was no chance he would be able to avoid submission to the legislature, and no chance doing so would result in its adoption.

To recount briefly, the SOFA was essentially a deal wherein the Iraqis would sign up willingly for colonial rule. I say colonial not as a loaded phrase meant to incite, but because under the tenets of the agreement, Iraq would have met every criteria. The US forces would operate completely independent of the Iraqi government, have complete immunity from Iraqi laws, be able to launch attacks from Iraq without notification or permission, and control completely Iraqi airspace. In essence, the exact model of the old British Empire where the Middle East was nominally controlled by locals but was in reality part of British Imperial rule. The British simply found it cheaper to have a third-party do the dirty work.

The SOFA, then, was a signal of how much times have changed. Whereas in Imperial times, the oil was siphoned out without the countries' consent, today the Iraqis are expected to sign their consent for the exact same circumstances. Picture a hangman offering a letter of consent to the condemned while in the noose.

The failure of months of negotiations over the more detailed accord -- blamed on both the Iraqi refusal to accept U.S. terms and the complexity of the task -- deals a blow to the Bush administration's plans to leave in place a formal military architecture in Iraq that could last for years.

The article matter-of-factly blames the failure of the proposal on "the Iraqi refusal to accept US terms," leaving aside any details of those US demands, and for obvious reasons. Those details which are left out, are not simply minor nuances to a larger agreement, but a signing over of Iraqi sovereignty to the US for the indefinite future, not something the Iraqi government, bound by democratic principles, could have signed. The only possibility of success from Bush's perspective, would have been if the Iraqis showed as much disdain for democracy as he does in his own country.

Negotiators expect [the deal] to include a "time horizon," with specific goals for U.S. troop withdrawal from Baghdad and other cities and installations such as the former Saddam Hussein palace that now houses the U.S. Embassy.

The fixed dates will likely include caveats referring to the ability of Iraqi security forces to take over from U.S. units, but without them, U.S. negotiators concluded that Iraqi acquiescence was doubtful. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his political allies have come under intense domestic pressure to reject any perceived infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. Maliki, who last week publicly insisted on a withdrawal timeline, wants to frame the agreement as outlining the terms for "Americans leaving Iraq" rather than the conditions under which they will stay, said the U.S. official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity because U.S.-Iraqi negotiations are ongoing.

Indeed, Maliki's submission to "domestic pressure" has thrown Bush and McCain for a loop, as they are not sure what a democracy in which the government performs the will of the people looks like.

In effect, Maliki is calling their bluff, as both Bush and McCain have said previously that "when the Iraqis ask us to leave, we'll leave." Now that the time is rapidly approaching, both are scrambling to dissemble, saying that Maliki is "just a politician" and surely wouldn't demand withdrawal before his security forces are ready. That is, before the US has ensured the economic end of the bargain.

The US would also like some more time to influence the October provincial elections, as Maliki still has plenty of work to do before Sadr's faction becomes politically inviable, the unstated goal of his recent pushes in Sadr City and Amara.

The negotiations surrounding the SOFA illustrate quite clearly what the US means by democracy. The tangible disdain that both Bush and McCain have shown for Maliki's willingness to submit his rule to the will of the Iraqi populace indicates that both would prefer a system more like that of the US, where politicians put on a happy face every four years, then spend the inter-nicene period trouncing on the public will. As Dick Cheney infamously quipped, the American public has one chance to voice their opinion, the general election. In between, the country belongs to the victors.

McCain surely knows a thing or two about pandering, but in calling for withdrawal, Maliki is doing no such thing. He is attempting to enforce the will of well over 80 percent of his population. Bush and McCain may call that pandering, but those of us still romantically tied to the events of 1776 call it democracy.


Related:

The Iraq SOFA: Not So Comfortable, June 5
US Holds Iraqi Funds Hostage Over SOFA, June 7
When a Guest Becomes a Squatter, June 15

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When a Guest Becomes a Squatter

In what should come as no surprise, the negotiation of the status of forces agreement between Iraq and the United States have reached an impasse. What is surprising, however, is the posturing of Nouri al Maliki, who is dependent on Washington sponsorship for his position, as his approval ratings among Sunnis stands a 8 percent and Shia 52 percent.

"Iraq has another option that it may use," Maliki said during a visit to Amman, Jordan. "The Iraqi government, if it wants, has the right to demand that the U.N. terminate the presence of international forces on Iraqi sovereign soil."

This is almost surely merely for effect, as it is nearly impossible for me to believe that Maliki in private has as much confidence in the ISF as he does in public. But, still, the implications of such a statement are worth examining. For one thing, asking the US to leave would call Bush's bluff on his promise to comply with such a request.

We are there at the invitation of the Iraqi government. This is a sovereign nation. Twelve million people went to the polls to approve a constitution. It’s their government’s choice. If they were to say, leave, we would leave.

If the US, absent a UN mandate and a negotiated SOFA, were to stay, it would in fact be illegally occupying a sovereign company, a situation which surely goes well beyond the well-worn talking points of the current domestic debate.

Already, though, the US has made concessions on the agreement, though not nearly enough to fully bring Iraq back to the table. One of the more egregious affronts to Iraqi sovereignty was a "U.S. demand that would have effectively handed over to the United States the power to determine if a hostile act from another country is aggression against Iraq." That purpose of that clause is not difficult to discern, as it clearly paves the way for the US to go to war against Iran under the pretext of protecting Iraq and without the consult of either the Iraqi government or the US Congress. One wonders how an attack on Iran would affect the mutual defense pact signed between Iran and Iraq last week. [That agreement was conspicuously absent from US media, lest they ruin a perfectly good, if not accurate, running narrative of Iran thwarting the will of the Iraqi government.]

Other concessions include "allowing Iraq to prosecute private contractors for violations of Iraqi law and requiring U.S. forces to turn over to Iraqi authorities Iraqis that the Americans detain."

While it is inconceivable that Maliki would follow through on his statement, it does signal the extent of the impasse over the deliberations regarding the SOFA. Bush will surely find a way to disregard the US Congress, but Maliki will have no such luck with his MPs. All of which makes the four-plus years of hiding its real intentions was a good strategic decision for the Bush administration.

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Maliki Assures Iran SOFA Not a Threat

Despite of the image propagated by the Bush administration and its media stenographers, the Iraq-Iran relationship is a mutual alliance and not merely one-sided meddling, with Iran aiding assorted rabble allied against the US occupation. It is little surprise, then, that Nouri al Maliki traveled to Tehran this week to assuage Iranian fears of a permanent US presence in Iraq spurred by news of the looming status of forces agreement.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pushed Iran on Sunday to back off its fierce opposition to a U.S.-Iraqi security pact, promising Iranian leaders that Iraq will not be a launching pad for any attack on their country.

The agreement has become a center of contention as Baghdad tries to balance its close ties to Washington and Tehran. Iran fiercely opposes the deal, fearing it will lead to permanent U.S bases on its doorstep in Iraq amid fears of an eventual American attack.

The Iranian fears seem well-founded if current events are any guide, especially given that the proposed SOFA includes freedom of movement for US forces both within Iraq and across its borders. Neither would require the knowledge or consent of the sovereign-in-name-only Iraqi government. It is ludicrous to believe that the US, in the event of an attack on Iran, would hesitate to use some of its 50-base windfall as a launching pad.

The question, then, becomes how can Maliki make any such guarantee to the Iranians? The Bush administration has been eerily silent on the meetings, and the promise. Ostensibly, by refusing to ever acknowledge the cozy relationship between Maliki and Ahmadinejad it can continue to play up the 'special groups' angle, despite its demonstrably farcical premise. If the SOFA were signed 'as is,' Maliki would be helpless in backing up his promise, leaving a parliamentary opposition strong enough to elicit major changes in the terms.

Maliki, however, must side with Washington while still appearing to protect Iraqi sovereignty, a task becoming more difficult daily as his Da'wa Party frays beneath him. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari has formed a splinter group, taking MPs with him along the way. Together, they are forming a broad nationalist coalition which will virulently oppose any deal with permanent US bases or freedom of operations for US forces.

Whatever his ability to follow through, Maliki's commitment to Iran is in stark contrast to the picture painted by President Bush.

"Iraq, today, does not represent a threat as it was during the former regime because it has become a constitutional country based on the rule of law," a statement released by his Baghdad office quoted him as saying.

"Iraq is working on developing its relations with the countries of the region on the basis of mutual understanding and cooperation," it added.

[...]

Al-Maliki also appeared to signal that Tehran would not be squeezed out by any agreement, saying Iraq's "development and stability will be provided through more bilateral cooperation" with Iran.

For its part, the US again illustrates a brilliant lack of foreign policy comprehension, unwilling to accept that Iraqis would disapprove of a deal making their country a playground for Americans devoid of Iranian influence.

U.S. officials increasingly see the criticism against the security deal as driven by Iran — particularly through al-Sadr.

"The U.S.-Iraqi negotiations (on the pact) concern the American and the Iraqi sides. As we have noticed, the Iranian contribution again is not positive regarding this," U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Mirembe Nantongo told journalists Sunday in Baghdad.

While Sadr surely opposes the relationship, Maliki allies (or non-enemies, maybe) al Sistani and al Hakim have spoken out as well. IHT also reports that the Iraqi National Security Council rejected several drafts of the agreement because of blatant infringements on Iraqi sovereignty. To paint Iran as the only catalyst for opposition fits only one purpose, and it's not "description of reality."

The US has thus far engaged in a little willful ignorance on the role of Iran. By refusing to acknowledge the close relationship with the Maliki government, it can continue to play up the destructive aspects and meddling. But eventually, the reality of the Iraq-Iran ties will have to figure in to foreign policy calculations.

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US Holding Iraqi Funds Hostage Over SOFA

On Thursday, I wrote about Patrick Cockburn's reporting on the pending status of force agreement between Iraq and the US, one that would include US leases of 50 bases, control of Iraqi airspace, and freedom of operations and immunity for US forces and civilian contractors. The deal was clearly an infringement on Iraqi sovereignty and extremely unpopular with the Iraqi populace--and, by extension, the Iraqi parliament--so President Bush is trying to push it through as a deal between Nouri al Maliki and he.

Part of this strategy, incredibly, includes a threat to Iraq's $50 billion foreign reserves.

The US is holding hostage some $50bn (£25bn) of Iraq's money in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pressure the Iraqi government into signing an agreement seen by many Iraqis as prolonging the US occupation indefinitely, according to information leaked to The Independent.

US negotiators are using the existence of $20bn in outstanding court judgments against Iraq in the US, to pressure their Iraqi counterparts into accepting the terms of the military deal, details of which were reported for the first time in this newspaper yesterday.

Iraq's foreign reserves are currently protected by a presidential order giving them immunity from judicial attachment but the US side in the talks has suggested that if the UN mandate, under which the money is held, lapses and is not replaced by the new agreement, then Iraq's funds would lose this immunity. The cost to Iraq of this happening would be the immediate loss of $20bn.

Because Iraq is technically still listed as a danger to world stability under UN chapter 7, a Saddam hangover, the US is bribing its new friend by establishing the price of losing that stigma as signing the SOFA as is, and granting US forces free reign within the sovereign state. That the US would expect any independent state to allow its forces the right to conduct operations and arrests its citizens all with full immunity is incredible in itself, but to force through the agreement as if it's getting Johnny Fontane a contract defies credulity.

The US has already cost the Iraqi government around $5 billion dollars through the Treasury Department's handling of the funds, held in the Bank of New York.

Iraqi officials say that, last year, they wanted to diversify their holdings out of the dollar, as it depreciated, into other assets, such as the euro, more likely to hold their value. This was vetoed by the US Treasury because American officials feared it would show lack of confidence in the dollar.

Iraqi officials say the consequence of the American action was to lose Iraq the equivalent of $5bn.

In spite of the US attempts to strong-arm the Iraqis into accepting the deal verbatim, snags are already appearing, as Iraqi officials are speaking out against the SOFA's affront to Iraqi sovereignty.

Iraq said on Friday it would not grant U.S. troops freedom of movement for military operations in a new agreement being negotiated on extending the presence of American troops on its soil.

Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih said the United States wanted its forces to operate with no restrictions, but this was not acceptable to Iraq.

Tension particularly arises when considering al Maliki's precarious position within his own government, a position which just got even more shaky. Maliki knows the deal will be unpopular, but also knows he is dependent upon the US for both military backing and legitimacy. The US, of course, knows this as well, which is why it's in a position to threaten Iraq. Grand Ayatollah al Sistani and al Hakim, the leaders most supportive of the central government, have not come out fully against the deal, but have stated that no deal which allows the Americans free reign would be acceptable. Maintaining their support is vital to the success of any long term alliance between the two nations.

Already Maliki's hold on stability is faltering however, as Juan Cole reports his Da'wa Party has "decisively split."

The new branch, Da'wa- National Reform, has been formed by former PM Ibrahim Jaafari, and the local leadership of Islamic Mission political offices in many cities, including in Najaf, has defected to it.

[...]

These 90 MPs oppose the soft partition of Iraq and generally have a strong Iraqi nationalist orientation. Several have expressed opposition to the US-Iraqi security agreement now being negotiated.

Of those 90 MPs, 30 are Sadrists. While Maliki is supposed to hold the country together, he is being forced at gunpoint into a wildly-unpopular alliance on one side and facing the crumbling of his own political party on the other.

Apparently, al-Maliki has been maneuvered by the Bush administration into a position where he has virtually no popular or party support, and is left with Washington has his only anchor.

Which makes Bush three-for-three on backing unpopular leaders, as he continues to push his relationship with Musharraf despite his plummeting import among Pakistanis.

An overview of the tempest surrounding the SOFA is not hard to ascertain. President Bush, knowing the unpopularity of such a deal, is trying desperately to keep both congresses out of it, forcing Maliki's hand by holding funds hostage and forcing him into a position that may very well turn out to be politically untenable. Maliki is dependent on the US for support, but should he sign a unilateral deal which signs away Iraqi sovereignty he will forfeit nearly all popular support.

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The Iraq SOFA: Not So Comfortable

When President Bush and Nouri al Maliki released the joint "Declaration of Principles" late last year, it foreshadowed a contentious battle over the July 31 deadline for a status of forces agreement (SOFA) between the two countries. In order to avoid seeking Congressional approval, Bush and Maliki are negotiating the SOFA as an 'executive agreement' rather than a formal treaty, despite the long-standing precedent of Presidents submitting such agreements to the Senate for ratification.

President Bush's plan to forge a long-term agreement with the Iraqi government that could commit the US military to defending Iraq's security would be the first time such a sweeping mutual defense compact has been enacted without congressional approval, according to legal specialists.

After World War II, for example - when the United States gave security commitments to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and NATO members - Presidents Truman and Eisenhower designated the agreements as treaties requiring Senate ratification. In 1985, when President Ronald Reagan guaranteed that the US military would defend the Marshall Islands and Micronesia if they were attacked, the compacts were put to a vote by both chambers of Congress.

In general SOFAs don't include a mutual-defense agreement, but rather concern legal aspects of hosting US forces and jurisdictional issues. While Bush is not legally bound to submit such an agreement for ratification, more than a half century of presidents have done so, especially when a mutual-defense contract is included. Considering the political implications of the Iraq conflict--surely more prescient than the Marshall Islands--his refusal to do so promises conflict in Washington this summer, especially considering the lengths by which this particular SOFA exceeds those before it. Also, previous SOFAs not submitted to Congress dealt only with leasing agreements, not a promise of defense and active military operations by US forces including arrests and detentions of Iraqis.

But the "long-term relationship of cooperation and friendship" outlined in November goes far beyond an ordinary status-of-forces agreement. It would include promises of debt forgiveness, economic and technical aid, facilitating "especially American investments" in Iraq - and the security commitments, according to Bush and Maliki's joint declaration last November.

Today, the Independent's [UK] Patrick Cockburn is reporting that the coming agreement includes US use of 50 bases, control of Iraqi airspace, and legal immunity to American military personnel and contractors. The deal, if adopted, could tie the next president's hands on any proposed withdrawal.

A secret deal being negotiated in Baghdad would perpetuate the American military occupation of Iraq indefinitely, regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November.

The terms of the impending deal, details of which have been leaked to The Independent, are likely to have an explosive political effect in Iraq. Iraqi officials fear that the accord, under which US troops would occupy permanent bases, conduct military operations, arrest Iraqis and enjoy immunity from Iraqi law, will destabilize Iraq's position in the Middle East and lay the basis for unending conflict in their country.

As with Bush's wariness of the US Senate, "the US is adamantly against the new security agreement being put to a referendum in Iraq, suspecting that it would be voted down." Article 58, Section 4 of the Iraqi Constitution, however, clearly dictates that the Iraqi Parliament must ratify such an agreement.

A law shall regulate the ratification of international treaties and agreements by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives.

But Bush knows any agreement which prolongs the American presence in Iraq will be extremely unpopular, as 70 percent of Iraqis oppose the US occupation, and thus will fight strongly to bypass the democracy he touts at every opportunity. For all its pomp, the administration is clearly opposed to democracy whenever it should interfere with its unfettered operation, be it at home or abroad.

There are several things contained in the proposed agreement which promise conflict, and they are worth considering on an individual basis.

First, there is the issue of jurisdiction over American personnel and civilian contractors. Most SOFAs, such as the one with Japan, impose stipulations on when the host country can prosecute Americans and when that right falls into the hands of the US.

Most SOFAs recognize the right of the host government to "primary jurisdiction," which is to say the host country exercises jurisdiction for all cases in which U.S. military personnel violate the host country's laws. There are two exceptions, however, which generally apply only in criminal cases involving U.S. forces personnel: When the offense is committed by Americans against Americans ("inter se" cases), and when the offense is committed by Americans in carrying out official duty. In these situations, the United States has primary jurisdiction over the accused American. [globalsecurity.org]

The proposal, however, eliminates entirely the right of the Iraqis to prosecute Americans for any crime, whether it is concomitant with official duty or not. If Japan and East Timor are any indication, US soldiers are not necessarily on their best behavior while off duty, as incidences of rape have been numerous in the former country. While any suggestion that all US soldiers are inclined to sexual battery is fallacious, to suggest that every US soldier is inherently incapable of committing crimes against the citizens of the host country is equally so.

Chalmers Johnson devotes an entire chapter in his book, Nemesis, to the US SOFA with Japan:

What SOFAs do, however, is give American soldiers, contractors, Department of Defense civilians, and their dependents a whole range of special privileges that are not available to ordinary citizens of the country or to non-American visitors. In the great tradition of 'extraterritoriality' that began in the world of nineteenth-century Western colonialism, they are almost never reciprocal [NATO excepted]--that is, the SOFAs bestow on Americans privileges that are not available to citizens of the host nation if they should visit or be assigned to the United States. [pp 171-172, paperback]

Strikingly, the US also demands certain guarantees it has been loathe to grant to its own detainees.

U.S. military commanders are responsible for seeing that individuals under their authority who run afoul with host-county laws receive fair trials from the host country under all circumstances. DoD directives list 14 "fair trial" safeguards or guarantees that are considered applicable to U.S. state court criminal proceedings by virtue of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. These safeguards include the right of the accused person to be tried without unreasonable delay, to be tried by an impartial court, and to be protected from the use of a confession obtained by torture, threats, or violence. [GlobalSecurity]

But even when the accused are not turned over to host authorities, US soldiers are subject to court martial. In Iraq, however, American civilian contractors would be subject to no one, as they are not under military jurisdiction. If put into effect as is, the SOFA would essentially create an army of extrajudicial contractors immune from any and all consequences for their actions regardless of severity or import, and would severely call into question the true extent of Iraqi sovereignty.

Apart from the proposed extrajudicial nature of the American occupation, the SOFA virtually guarantees a long-term US presence, most likely immune to the effect of the November election. By guaranteeing protection, the SOFA would force a hypothetical President Obama's hand by putting him in a position of either leaving American forces in Iraq or dissolving the SOFA and presenting a United States that does not follow through on its signed commitments, a terrible PR move for a green leader.

The unfettered use of bases and air space is clearly also aimed at positioning the US for future conflict in Iran, something that may begin before year's end, again holding the next president hostage. Strangely enough, such an occurrence was addressed in the Declaration of Principles agreed to by Bush:

Cooperating jointly with the states of the region on the basis of mutual respect, non-intervention in internal affairs, rejection of the use of violence in resolving disputes, and adoption of constructive dialogue in resolving outstanding problems among the various states of the region.

No more than flattering rhetoric, surely, but such is the status quo.

Either way, "Mr Bush is determined to force the Iraqi government to sign the so-called 'strategic alliance' without modifications, by the end of next month." [Cockburn] This sense of urgency requires the bypassing of both countries' legislatures--despite overwhelming precedent and written law--and is based on a desire to ensure there will be no precipitous withdrawal of American forces in January.

While the rest of us are relieved the Democratic nominating process is nearing an end, President Bush certainly wishes the distraction would continue. Expect the proposed SOFA to be a firestorm in Washington for the next couple of months.

President Bush swaddles himself in the rhetorical love of democracy, but when presented with two nations where three-fourths of the population strongly opposes a proposal, he has absolutely no qualms about subverting both.

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